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LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
MISSOURI SMALL LOAN PROBLEM
GEORGE L. GISLER*
I. INTRODUICION
The contest between the efforts of lawmakers and agencies of law en-
forcement on the one hand, and the ingenuity and rapacity of the loan shark
on the other hand, has been a close one through the years, with the latter
enjoying the fruits of victory currently in Missouri. As Dr. Kelso has so
ably shown, the need of the small borrower, unfulfilled through legitimate
channels under ordinary usury laws, left the borrower with no choice but the
illegal high rate lender. Under these circumstances natural economic laws
have proved themselves more powerful than prohibitory laws or the efforts
of social workers and legal aid societies. The presence of the loan shark
problem again in Missouri properly leads us to review the history of Mis-
souri laws and the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, of those laws for
such assistance in the solution of the problem as can be drawn from our
experience.
II. MISSOURI LAWs AND CASES TO 1927
Because the loan shark is a by product of the industrial era, we are not
surprised to find that the problem he created first received the attention of
courts and legislatures in the latter part of the last century.- Even before
Missouri statehood, laws effective in Missouri limited interest charges to
customary rates.2 The progressive enactment, in a trial and error method,
of various laws relating to the problem, however, is convincing evidence in
itself that somehow the earlier laws were not an effective force in dealing
with the problem. The dates when the laws were enacted and a brief char-
acterization of each are as follows:
*Attorney, Kansas City. A.B., Butler University, 1930; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1933.
1. For a comprehensive statement- of the fundamental background of the
problem see: GALLERT, HILLBORN AND MAY, SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION (Russell
Sage Foundation, 1932); ROBINSON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF SMALL LOAN
BUSINESS (Russell Sage Foundation, 1935); 8 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRom. pp. 1-108
(1941).
2. La. Terr. Laws 1808, November 5, 1808. In the absence of contract 6%
was the rate. Ten percent was permitted by contract. Usury could be pleaded
as a defense. This law remained virtually unchanged until 1891 when the contract
maximum was reduced from 10% to 8%, Laws 1891, page 169. The general usury
law has remained substantially unchanged to this date. See §§ 408.020 and 408.030,
Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
(207)
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1891 (Laws 1891, page 170) Declared invalid any chattel mort-
gage given to secure a usurious loan. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 408.070 (1949).
1897 (Laws 1897, page 202) Made it a crime to charge more than
I per cent per month on loans of $500 and less secured by
chattel mortgage on household goods.
1899 (Laws 1899, page 166) Made it a crime to sell or transfer a
note or contract known to be usurious without notifying
the transferee. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 561.430 (1949).
1899 (Laws 1899, page 167) Made it a crime to charge more than
2%o per month; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.900 (1949).
1905 (Laws 1905, page 172) Authorized action for recovery of
usurious interest; Mo Rev. Stat. § 408.050 (1949).
1911 (Laws 1911, Page 143) Declared assignments of unearned
wages to be void; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 432.030 (1949).
1913 (Laws 1913, page 545) An act regulating chattel loan busi-
ness (provisions to be explained in detail later).
1919 (Laws 1919, page 239) Loan and Investment Companies Act,
Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 368 (1949).
1927 (Laws 1927, page 252) Small Loan Act. Mo. Rev. Stat. Art.
7, c. 39 (1939).
1927 (Laws 1927, page 164) Credit Union Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. c.
370 (1949).
1929 (Laws 1929, page 201) Amendment to Small Loan Laws re-
ducing rate to 2%7 o% and enacting Section 16.
1933 (Laws 1933, page 199) Amendment to Loan and Investment
Company Act changing investigation fee and adding $20
"extra hazard" fee.
1939 (Laws 1939, page 772) Amendment to Small Loan Laws
permitting 3%o per month on loans of $100 and less and
reenacting regulatory section on salary buying.
1941 (Laws 1941, page 331) Minor changes in Credit Union Act.
1943 (Laws 1943, page 502) Major changes in Loan and Invest-
ment Company Act; regulation, supervision, reports, reg-
ulation of investigation fee and of "extra hazard" fee.
The existence of a racket in small chattel mortgages is attested by a
number of early cases which demonstrate the occasion for the 1891 law.
These cases involve loans made after that law, for there would have been no
relief for the borrowers involved in those loans without the 1891 law. In
Fidelity Loan Guarantee Company v. Taker,3 the loan was made in 1891 for
3. 54 Mo. App. 79 (1893).
(Vol. 16
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a period of six months in the approximate amount of $140 on boarding house
furniture. This was a renewal of a prior obligation and the borrower signed
one note for $151.25 and five notes of $7.50 each, making a total interest
charge of approximately $47.25. The 1891 law was used as a defense to the
lenders suit for possession of the furniture.' A charge of $70 interest and
$106 storage charges was made on a chattel loan of $44.50 made in 1892 in
Johnson v. Vette.r The action was in replevin under the 1891 statute.
The effectiveness of the 1891 Act was impaired by the holding in sev-
eral cases that the mortgage would not be void if in the hands of a purchaser
in good faith for value. The borrower then had the additional burden of
proving that the mortgage was not purchased in good faith because most
lenders began using straw parties. In Smith v. Mohrr the defendant paid
$50 for a $125 chattel loan for 10 months and the evidence showed the
alleged bona fide purchaser was really a straw party for plaintiff. A similar
type of transaction was presented in Johtnson v. Simmons,7 where plaintiff
finally recovered his furniture after two changes of venue, trials in a justice
of the peace court and the circuit court, and the appeal to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals. The 1891 law was held constitutional in Kreibohvm v.
Yancey," where the borrower paid $77 for the use of $175 for one year.
From the number of these cases which reached appellate courts even
though the amount involved was small, we can safely assume that the high
rate chattel loan business was of considerable volume. The 1897 law was
another attempt to aid the borrower. It sought to overcome the effect of
Smith v. Mohr, supra, by making the mortgage void even though purchased
in good faith for value. The purchaser was given a remedy against the
transferor. Significantly the 1897 law recognized that the evil was confined
to loans of $500 and less, and, by making it a crime to charge more than 1%
4. Plaintiff apparently contended he was a broker to evade the effect of the
1891 law, see id. at 82:
"The plaintiff itself seems nearly as much of a myth as Teutsch. The
business methods of both of these parties appear from the evidence to have
been strangely devious and complex. It is made to appear that Teutsch,
a Chicago capitalist, was in the habit of loaning his money at the modest
rate of eight per cent in Kansas City on Chattel mortgages covering such
personal property as old and well-worn boarding-house furniture when
guaranteed by the plaintiff corporation, whose capital as far as the evidence
discloses is invisible. It appears that the plaintiff is the only party that
realized any profit or advantage- from the Teutsch transactions."
5. 77 Mo. App. 563 (1898).
6. 64 Mo. App. 39 (1895).
7. 61 Mo. App. 395 (1895).
8. 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1900).
1951]
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per month on chattel loans, gave tacit approval to that rate. The 1899 Act
(p. 167), which is still in effect, makes it a crime to charge more than 2%
per month.9
Whether because the 1897 and 1899 Acts were effective or because of
change in other circumstances, illegal lenders next turned to wage assign-
ments as security for loans. These transactions were so complicated that
borrowers and even the courts had difficulty understanding what had oc-
curred. From the lenders' standpoint the transactions were simpler to
handle and the wage assignment was a far more effective security than chat-
tel mortgages. A number of cases demonstrate the presence of groups of high
rate lenders in various parts of the state, some of them undoubtedly parts of
a chain of lenders. In Bell v. Mulholland,° the borrower had paid $170 on
a loan of $115 in three years and the entire principal was claimed to be due.
Eighty one dollars was charged as interest on eighty three dollars for four
months in D. H. Tonawn P. Union Casualty and Surety Company.': Ap-
parently the same lender was involved in Henderson v. D. H. Tolman.12
Two cases arising under the 1905 law indicate a prevailing charge of 10%
per month on wage assignment loans. The same lender was operating in
several towns.'3
In these cases the borrowers signed an array of complex instruments of
assignment and agency. Copies of these instruments or receipts for pay-
ments were never given to borrowers, who were confused as to their rights.
It was practices of this character which led to the inclusion of Section 8163,
Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) in the Small Loan Laws, requiring the
lender to give the borrower a clear concise statement of all the important
aspects of the loan as well as receipts for all payments. The wage assign-
ment was such an effective means for evading the usury statutes that it was
later regulated as a loan.' 4
These cases, as well as the emergency clause of the 1913 Act, are wit-
ness to the fact that illegal high rate lending continued in Missouri despite
9. See Ex parte Berger, 193 Mo. 16, 90 S.W. 759 (1905), which held this
act to be constitutional. In a well written opinion our supreme court upheld the
power of the legislature to regulate interest rates and to classify loans. The case
was important in the validity of the Credit Union Laws and Small Loan Laws,
both of 1927, and it has been widely cited in other jurisdictions.
10. 90 Mo. App. 612 (1901).
11. 90 Mo. App. 274 (1901).
12. 130 Mo. App. 498, 109 S.W. 76 (1908).
13. Snyder v. L. F. Crutcher, 137 Mo. App. 121, 118 S.W. 489 (1909); L .F.
Crutcher v. Sims, 184 Mo. App. 488, 170 S.W. 430 (1914).
14. See §§ 8165 and 8166, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
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all previous efforts to stop it.15 The 1913 Act was limited to cities of 30,000
population or more and provided for licensing, bonding, supervision and
regulation of those persons who engaged in the chattel loan business. There
were severe civil and criminal penalties and the lenders were required to
give the borrowers receipts for payments. The Act recognized that legitimate
capital would not enter the business unless more than the ordinary contract
rates of interest were permitted. Hence, the act allowed licensees to charge 2
per cent per month, together with certain fees.
III. THE SMALL LOAN LAWS
The principal shortcomings of the 1913 Act were that it dealt only with
one part of the small loan business6q--the chattel loan business-and that
the permitted rate of 2% per month plus certain charges was inadequate.
The lasA is proved by the fact that only one person ever obtained a license
under the act.17 Hence, the Act had virtually no impact on lending. The
Act, however, was characteristic of the more enlightened approach to the
loan shark problem at that time. Since 1907 the Russell Sage Foundation,
a philanthropic foundation of New York City had sponsored a series of
pioneer studies of the problem."" These studies gradually led to an under-
standing of the fundamental complexities underlying a solution. Legisla-
tures were not slow in adopting the results of these studies. In time, men
began to realize that loan shark rackets could be stopped only by encourag-
ing legitimate business to destroy the loan sharks by competition with more
reasonable charges and that legitimate capital could be attracted to the busi-
15. The emergency clause, Laws 1913, page 545 was as follows:
"That the wide spread and evil effects upon many people in the cities
described in Section 1 of the foregoing Act consequent upon the charge
of oppressive and usurious rates of interest by persons and corporations
(commonly called loan sharks) engaged in the chattel loan business in
said cities creates an emergency within the meaning of the Constitution;
and therefore, this Act shall take effect and be enforced from and after
its passage and approval."
16. By 1913 the wage assignment lending racket was considerable. Perhaps
it was believed that the 1911 Act, declaring assignments of unearned wages to
be void, had solved this problem. The 1911 Act, however, proved no obstacle
to extensive operations in later years. Salary buyers made a substantial portion
of their loans to railroad workers whose wages are normally "held back" two weeks.
Furthermore, most borrowers did not know about the 1911 Act. See Gisler and
Birkhead, Salary Buying in Kansas City, Missouri (Conference on Personal Finance
Law, New York, 1938).
17. This was the Welfare Loan Agency of Kansas City operated as a charity
with funds largely fumished by the philanthropist, William Volker.
18. Two of the most important early studies were: WAssAM, THE SALARY LOAN
BusINEss IN NEW YORK CITY (Russell Sage Foundation, 1908); HAM, THE CHATrEL
LOAN BusiNEss (Russell Sage Foundation, 1909).
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ness only if the law permitted charges which recognize the increased risk
and the greater cost of doing business in proportion to the size of the loans.
While the 1913 Act recognized these principles, it failed mainly because
the charges permitted-2% per month-were insufficient to induce legiti-
mate businessmen to invest their capital in such a business."0 By 1927 a
number of states had adopted the Russell Sage Model Act,20 and in the
light of experience, various improvements had been made in it.21 In 1927
most of the Act as recommended by the Russell Sage Foundation was adopt-
ed in Missouri. The principal provisions of this Act were:
1. Licensing, supervision and regulation. All persons, partnerships and
corporations engaging in the business of lending sums of $300.00 and less
and charging more than 8% per year were required to obtain a license from
the State Finance Commissioner, submit annual reports and to be subject
to supervision and regulation.
2. Licensees were permitted, in lieu of all other charges and fees, to
charge interest at 3 /z 7 per month on declining unpaid balances of loans.
3. Severe civil penalties for violation of the act, including stringent
definitions to prevent evasion. These penalties included revocation of the
license and forfeiture of all principal and interest in any individual transac-
tion.22
19. With the number of chattel mortgage lenders in business in 1913 it is
inconceivable that they would not have sought licenses had the 2 rate been at-
tractive. In 1929 there were 141 lenders who had obtained licenses in two years un-
der the Small Loan Act which then offered a 3 V2. % per month rate.
20. These states and the dates of enactment were: 1911, Massachusetts; 1914,
New Jersey; 1915, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. These laws were enacted
before the Russell Sage Model Act of 1916. States which followed were: 1917,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire and Utah; 1918, Maryland and Virginia;
1919, Arizona, Colorado and Connecticut; 1920, Georgia; 1921, Iowa and Michigan;
1923, Rhode Island; 1925, Florida, Michigan (revision), Tennessee and West
Virginia.
21. For a complete discussion of the development of the small loan laws and
an analysis of the basis for each section see: Hubachek, The Development of Rcgu.
latory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941). Also: GALLERT,
AND MAY, SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION (Russell Sage Foundation, 1932); ROBINSON
AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF SMALL LOAN BUSINESS (Russell Sage Foundation,
1935).
22. The effectiveness of the penalty clauses of the Small Loan Laws is demon-
strated by the two following cases: Vaughn v. Graham, 234 Mo. App. 781, 121
S.W. 2d 222 (1938) and Vining v. Probst, 239 Mo. App. 157, 186 S.W. 2d 611
(1945).
In the Vaughn case it was held that a licensee could not compound interest
by adding interest to the principal in a renewal note. The entire transaction was
held void under § 8168, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
Vining was a "hip pocket" lender in Kansas City. When confronted with §
8168 and the fact that he was not licensed under the Small Loan Laws he adopted
[Vol. 16
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By 1929 there were 141 licenses issued under this Act and illegal loan
operations had been materially reduced. An important omission in the
1927 Act had been the failure to include that part of Section 16 of the Uni-
form Act which defined an assignment of wages of $300 and less to be a
loan and defined as interest and difference between the amount of cash re-
ceived and the amount required to be repaid. The 1929 amendment enacted
this provision and also reduced the maximum charge from 3 / % to 2 Y/ % per
month. The number of licenses declined from 141 in 1929 to 87 in 1932, and
there was a lack of interest in making loans of $100 and less by licensees.
Since this was the traditional field for operation of the salary buying rack-
eteers, they began boldly plying their trade and challenged the constitu-
tionality of the 1929 salary buying amendment. They succeeded in obtain-
ing a holding that the part of the amendment relating to salary buying was
unconstitutional because of a technical defect in the title of the bill.2 3
The salary buying racket quickly assumed such proportions that free
legal aid committees of St. Louis and Kansas City lawyers were devoting a
major portion of their time to the problem.24 It is interesting to review the
legal remedies employed by these committees. A number of criminal prose-
cutions were instituted under what is now Section 563.800, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1949). Attorney General Roy McKittrick began several injunc-
tion suits both in Kansas City and St. Louis based on the theory that the
the ingenious but ineffective theory that he could abandon the usurious note and
sue on the loan of money with interest at only 6% per annum. The court enter-
tained no difficulty in holding the entire transaction to be void under § 8186, which
rendered unenforceable any transactions in violation of the Small Loan Laws.
Vining soon ceased business.
23. Sherrill v. Brantley, 334 Mo. 497, 66 S.W. 2d 529 (1933). The timing
of this case is of more than passing interest. The bill incorporating Section 16
into the small loan laws became effective on August 29, 1929. The wage assign-
ment involved in the case was executed on November 2, 1929 and the commissions
became due on November 9th. Sherrill (the lender) sued Brantley (the employer)
on November 13, 1929 for refusal to pay the commissions and the case was decided
by the St. Louis Circuit Court on March 21, 1930, holding the bill unconstitutional.
For a more complete report on both the 1927 and 1929 legislative sessions see
Gisler, Organization of Public Opinion Against Loan Sharks, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 187-189 (1941).
24. The author is personally acquainted with the Bar Association activities
and the history of this problem from 1936 to 1943 having been chairman of the
Loan Shark Committee of the Lawyers Association of Kansas City and of the
Small Loans Committee of the Missouri Bar Association. Work of the Kansas
City Committee is briefly summarized in Gisler and Birkhead, Salary Buying in
Kansas City, Missouri, supra n. 16. See also the following committee reports of
the Missouri Bar Association: 8 Mo. BAR J. 189 (1937); 9 Mo. BAR J. 194 (1938)
(this report lists all the cases filed by the Attorney General); 10 Mo. BAR J. 174
(1939); 11 Mo. BAR J. 105 (1940); 12 Mo. BAR J. 205 (1941); 13 Mo. BAR J. 179
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loan shark business is a public nuisance. 21 After delaying trials for some
time, the persons sought to be enjoined sold out to other persons who con-
tinued the business. While the omission of the section regulating salary
buying made it necessary to prove in each case that the salary buying trans-
actions were in fact usurious loans, the legal aid committees advised bor-
rowers to cease paying, under Section 8168, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1939).2r A number of cases were filed in St. Louis by salary buyers to en-
force collection, but these were vigorously defended by the legal aid com-
mittees. Despite the fact that some three thousand borrowers were advised
to cease paying in Kansas City, no such suits were filed there. A substantial
number of cases were filed by the legal aid committees under what is now
Section 408.050, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), to recover usurious in-
terest. Dilatory tactics, including an application to the supreme court for a
writ of prohibition required a Kansas City committee to expend over one
thousand hours of time on a case in which final judgment for $285.00 was
ultimately obtained. Despite all these efforts the loan shark racket con-
tinued unabated.2 7 Hence, the legal aid committees turned to a legislative
solution, the one which was achieved in 1939. That solution, first proposed
by the State Finance "Commissioners was for a re-enactment of the section
to outlaw salary buying and an increase in rates" to 3 %o per month on loans
of $100 and less to stimulate competition by the licensees in the field in
which the salary buyer operated. The bill was supported by nearly every
25. The legal theory and the cases supporting actions of this character are
discussed in 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1941).
26. Following the case of Household Finance Company v. Shaffner, 3$6 Mo.
808, 203 S.W. 2d 734 (1947), which declared the Small Loan Laws to be uncon-
stitutional under the 1945 Constitution, a revision bill in the legislature repealed
these laws. Hence the references to Small Loan Laws throughout this article neces-
sarily are to the 1939 revision.
27. There is not space in this article to demonstrate the difference between
the existence of a remedy at law and the effectiveness of that remedy in actual
practice with reference to the problem being discussed. The disparity between
the loan shark who had a lucrative business at stake and the borrower who had
only a few dollars involved and no funds with which to hire attorneys was one
factor. In the years from 1936 to 1939 the problem of attorneys to represent bor-
rowers was solved by the unremitting work of the legal aid committees. Most
borrowers, however, were afraid to assert their rights for the reason they were
afraid they would thereby terminate the availability of their only source of credit.
Some idea of the practical and legal difficulties facing the legal aid committees may
be obtained from: Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 54 (1941); Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, id at 78;
Kelley, Legal Techniques for Combating Loan Sharks, id at 88.
28. See Recommendations of Missouri State Finance Commissioner in Sum-
mary of Annual Reports of Personal Finance Companies in the years 1931, 1933,
1934, 1935, 1936 and 1938. These reports of the state supervising official were
addressed to the Governor and the members of the Legislature.
[Vol. 16
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segment of the population29 and on the day it became effective, every known
salary buyer had closed his office.
As a result of charges of improper lobbying activities in connection
with bills in the 1941 and 1943 sessions of the legislature a committee of
the House of Representatives headed by W. E. Bailey (formerly Judge of
the Springfield Court of Appeals and now Circuit Judge in Jasper County),
was appointed to investigate lending institutions.30 When the committee
opened its hearings on the lobbying charges those who had made the
charges presented no evidence as to any such activities. The committee
went on, however, to hold hearings on the need for amendments to the
small loan laws, the loan and investment act and the banking laws. This was
the first complete investigation into the small loans problem by the legisla-
ture and the report is therefore worthy of study. The final report recom-
mended no changes'in the Small Loan Laws, stated there was no evidence of
any violation of these laws by licensees, and found that the demand for small
loani was being adequately served.-'
IV. THME CREDIT UNION LAWS
A solution to the loan shark problem widely proposed in the latter part
of the 19th Century was the philanthropic Remedial Loan Society. In
nearly all the principal cities one or more of these Societies were organized
29. The story of the legislative campaigns in Missouri is reviewed in Gisler,
Organization of Public Opinion Against Loan Sharks, 8 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB.
187-194 (1941). For a more detailed report on the legislative program in 1939 see
Gisler, What Bar Associations Did in Missouri to Combat the Loan Shark Evib
(Program and Papers, Conference on Personal Finance Law, 1939).
30. Other members of this committee were J. J. Endres, William B. Weakley
and Raymond J. Lahey. On April 1, 1943, by resolution of the House of Representa-
tives Mr. Lahey was removed form the committee and was replaced by Morris
Osburn. Journal of the House, 62nd General Assembly, August 23, 1943, page 2209.
31. Journal of the House, 62nd General Assembly, August 23, 1943, page 2214:
"Not one scintilla of evidence was offered to this Committee showing or
tending to show that any of the licensed small loan companies were violat-
ing the Small Loan Law or any other law of this State. The evidence
before this Committee showed that those who are operating under the
Small Loan Law consisted of individuals, partnerships and corporations
and that all of them had assumed the responsibility for carrying out the
purposes of the Small Loan Law and that they furnished a complete and
adequate loan service in all amounts from $5 or $10 to $300."
On the rate question the report concluded at page 2217:
"In view of these circumstances it is quite likely that to reduce the cur-
rent rate would be to jeopardize the entire small loan industry in this
state, and to threaten small loan borrowers with the necessity of once
again becoming victims of the illegal high rate lenders who have re-
appeared in every state where the small loan rate has been reduced below
a figure at which licensed lenders could render an adequate service."
1951]
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and since they operated without profit and often with a loss, they aided in
ameliorating conditions. The present size of consumer installment lending
operations alone proves that even in a country as open handed as the United
States, it would be impossible to find enough capital on a philanthropic
basis to satisfy the need and the demand. An equally interesting and far
more practical approach to the problem is an application of the cooperative
idea.
A credit union-a cooperative savings and loan association for small
loans-is a group of persons united by some common interest (ordinarily
employment in the same business establishment) who pool their savings in
order to have a fund from which to make loans to members of the group in
time of need. A great deal of research and study was given to the problem
of developing the legal and economic framework on which a credit union
could operate successfully. Philanthropists such as Edward A. Filine made
notable contributions to the overall development of the movement.
The credit Union Act was enacted in Missouri in 1927, the same year
as the enactment of the Small Loan Laws, (Laws 1927, p. 164). Under this
act, a credit union is a corporation organized with a special charter author-
izing it to accept deposits from its member stockholders and to make loans
to such members. The making of loans is regulated and supervised and an
overall charge for loan services not to exceed a flat interest charge of 1 %
per month on declining balances is allowed. The only change in this law
of consequence to this study was the amendment of 1941 which permitted
a minimum interest charge of 25c per month regardless of the size of the
loan and which authorized the Treasurer (without reference of the applica-
tion to the loan committee) to make loans not to exceed $25 for a period of
not more than 30 days (Laws 1941, page 331).32
The credit union movement in Missouri is one of interest and signifi-
cance. The number of credit unions and total amount of loans outstanding,
as well as the stability of the companies, has enabled them to participate
effectively in the solution of the small loan problem. In dollar volume in
comparison with the commercial lending agencies, the participation until
recent years, however has not been large. Several factors contribute to
this result:
1. The amount of capital available to a credit union for lending is
obviously limited by factors other than the success or profitability of its
operations, i.e. the savings of its members.
32. The Credit Union Act is now Chapter 370, Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
(Vol. 16
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2. There is a natural reluctance on the part of an employee to air
his financial problems to his fellow workers. Hence, many victims of loan
sharks are persons who could borrow from credit unions2
V. LOAN & INVESTMENT COMPANY LAWS
The Loan and Investment Companies Act of 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 239)
gave legislative sanction to the Morris Plan type of lending. The sum is
borrowed at the legal rates and the note is due in a lump sum at the end
of the loan period. The return to the lender is virtually doubled by requir-
ing the borrower to purchase, in installments, a certificate of indebtedness
(or investment certificate) the last installment of which comes due on the
date the borrower's note becomes due. The Missouri Act also permitted
a charge of $1.00 for each $50 loaned "for expenses" in investigation of the
borrower. In Discount Corporation v. MitctJell,34 it was held that the in-
vestigation fee could be charged only if there were, and only in the amount
of, the actual expenses. A provision in the original law limiting the period
of loans to one year had proved to be a bonanza to certain less reputable
lenders who had incorporated under the Act and who were enabled thereby
to pyramid not only the discounted interest but investigation charges on
successive renewals.
The Mitchell case was a disappointment to the latter type of lenders,
who obtained a change in the law in 1933. This amendment (Laws 1933,
page 199) not only obviated the need for any correlation between actual
expenses and charging the investigation fee, but added a new fee of $20.00
which became known as the "extra hazard" fee. The basis for this fee was
a clause in the note providing that the borrower could surrender his auto-
mobile at any time regardless of condition in full satisfaction of the obliga-
tion. The fee was permitted because of the "extra hazard" in this type of
automobile loan.
By 1940 some of the business which developed under this act was de-
nominated by Bar Association Committees as a "racket."35 Borrowers who
33. See Gisler and Birkhead, op. cit., supra n. 16. In Appendix B, 300 loans
are detailed. Of these borrowers 25% were employed by companies with credit
unions to which they presumably could have applied for their loans. The same
condition obtained in the study of the Junior Bar Conference of the American
Bar Association on loan shark conditions in Kansas. The latter report was based
primarily on records seized by the prosecutor in a loan shark office in Kansas City,
Kansas. Unfortunately this report is now out of print.
34. 216 Mo. App. 100, 261 S.W. 743 (1924).
35. See particularly the reports of the Small Loans Committee in the years
1940 to 1943 referred to supra n. 24.
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had no automobiles were given titles to jalopies in junk yards so the extra
hazard fee could be charged. Fantastic charges were realized by repeated
forced renewals, with duplications of discounts, insurance charges, investiga-
tion fees and extra hazard fees. It was not uncommon to find loans in this
category where the charges aggregated 1000% per year on the amount of
cash advanced; 520%o and 240%o per year were very common charges.
Strangely enough, there was no public clamor to stop such practices. Since
it required arithmetic calculations and some knowledge of the law to deter-
mine what the charges were in terms of interest, the public accepted at face
value the representation that only 8% interest was being charged. Criti-
cism in the legislature was directed primarily at the "36% per year" small
loan companies.36 It was the Bar Association committees which first dem-
onstrated the unwholesome practices under this act and the investigation
and report of the Bailey committee which led to the corrective legislation
in 1943. 37
The 1949 revision of the statutes eliminated from the Loan and In-
vestment Act the requirements of licensing, regulation and supervision which
had been enacted in 1943.38 Even in 1943 the act stood on shaky ground
as a special law fixing interest rates and granting certain corporations spe-
cial rights, privileges and immunities.39 To examine fully the difficult con-
stitutional question in the light of the intricate wording of the Loan and
Investment Act would require more space than is possible in this article.
The constitutional prohibitions would appear to be violated, however, if the
Act allows loan and investment companies to make charges not allowed
to individuals and to other corporations and unless the loan and invest-
ment type of loan constitutes a proper classification. Because there are no
restrictions on these loans as to size, security, method of repayment etc.,
there would seem to be no reason that individuals and other corporations
should not be permitted to operate in the same manner and to make the
same changes.
The use of the investment certificate is a device which virtually doubles
the amount which a loan and investment company can earn from a loan,
36. This strange phenomenon was noted in the Bailey Committee report,
Journal of the House, 62nd General Assembly, August 23, 1943, page 2212.
37. See the complete report and recommendations op. cit. supra. n 36, pages
2218-2222. Virtually all the recommendations of the committee were adopted.
38. Mo. Ray. STAT. c. 368 (1949).
39. The present constitutional limitations are the same as the old ones:
Article III, Section 40, subsections (26) and (28).
[Vol. 16
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as opposed to the maximums allowed other individuals and corporations.
Similarly the investigation fee and the extra hazard fee also increase the
rate of return, an increase which is not available to individuals or to other
corporations. The investigation fee is justifiable only if it represents actual
expenses.40  The 1933 amendment eliminated this justification. Several
lower court decisions have held the certificate plan of operation to be
usurious.-' Two New York cases have held that payments on the invest-
ment certificate are actually payments on the loan; a holding which, if
applied to the Missouri law, means that a greater interest rate is allowed
loan and investment companies on loans than is allowed to other corporations
or individuals. In People's Loan & Investment Company v. Singer,42 the
court said:
"One finds it difficult to appreciate how an investment company
can issue an evidence of indebtedness for moneys which it does not
owe and how a so-called installment certificate, which has 'no
value other than the agreement of the borrower to pay the amount
of his loan,' can be considered additional security for the loan."
A more recent case has held that the extra hazard charge is in fact
interest. The court said:
"We are convinced that the extra hazard charges which constituted
such a large percentage of the corporation's total income for the
taxable years were received for the use of money loaned. The fact
that in order to be permitted to retain for itself any part of the
extra charges exacted, the Missouri law required the corporation to
agree to accept the security in full settlement of the indebtedness
and that the corporation complied with that law does not alter this
conclusion. The extra charge is authorized "on account of the extra
hazards involved in such loans.' In other words, the charge is
authorized because of the extra hazard to the lender in making such
loans. The Missouri statute does not authorize the extra charge in
consideration of the option. It authorizes it in recognition of in-
sufficiency of an 8%o interest rate and protects the borrower to the
40. See Stewart v. Boone County Trust Company, 230 Mo. App. 120, 87
S.W. 2d 223 (1935), where the court said, at 226:
S.. where a contract for a loan, which requires in terms, or from neces-
sary implication, the rendition of services by the lender for the benefit
of the borrower, a fair and reasonable charge, for the services over and
above the highest legal rate of interest on the money loaned, does not
render. the contract usurious. '
41. These cases are cited and referred to in Collins, Evasion and Avoidance
of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CoNmEMP. PROB. 66. (1941).
42. 140 Misc. 383, 250 N. Y. Supp. 613 (Sup. Ct. 1931). See also Morris
Plan of New York v. Osnato, 123 Misc. 152, 204 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Supp. Ct 1924).
1951]
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extent that, having paid the additional charge he will not subse-
quently be subject to a deficiency judgment in case of foreclosure
of the security.
The corporation's business is that of a money lender, not an in-
surer."4"
Up to 1945 a few Missouri cases had sustained loans made under the Loan
and Investment Act. The constitutionality of the Act, however, was not
raised in these cases."
VI. BANKING LAWS
Until recent years banks made few small loans. Certainly the maximum
interest rate of 8% per annum did not encourage banks to make such loans.
Such loans were also regarded as being too hazardous for the investment of
depositor's funds. Gradually, however, and particularly in the larger cities,
banks have entered the consumer credit field through the discount of com-
mercial paper and even more recently, by direct loans. These loans are
made under the general usury laws which permit a maximum interest rate
of 8%o per annum. Under the banking act this charge can be discounted
in advance.45 In all other respects as to penalties, etc., banks are subject
to the general usury laws.
The small loan laws in effect in Missouri from 1927 to 1946 specifically
exempted banks from the application of those laws. Neither could a bank
be a credit union, nor exercise the corporate powers peculiar to a loan and
investment company. While the exclusion of banks from the small loan laws
denied them the benefits of higher maxmium charges, it also enabled them
to escape the additional regulation and supervision as well as the severe
penalties for usury which were a part of those laws.
In legislative sessions in 1941 and 1943 bills were introduced to create
small loan laws for banks. The availability of depositor's funds and the
fact that such small loan operations might be handled by existing facilities
and personnel led to the belief that banks might supply the demand for cer-
tain types of small loans at lower rates than other lending institutions. The
bills introduced provided for maximum charges approximating 15% to 19%lo
per annum simple interest. The desirability of such laws to enable banks
43. Bond Auto Loan Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 153
F. 2d 50, 51 (8th Cir. 1946).
44. Auto Money Corp. v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 862, 153 S.W. 2d 113 (1941);
Van Doeren v. Pelt, 184 S.W. 2d 744 (Mo. App. 1945); Huddleston v. Ozark Accept-
ance Corp., 125 S.W. 2d 81 (Mo. App. 1939).
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 362.105 (1949).
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to increase their services in the field of small loans in the larger cities was
scarcely questioned.46 Rural legislators, however, most of whom had no
small loans problems of any kind in their districts, were afraid to endorse
such legislation for fear it might result in farmers and small businessmen
paying higher interest rates in rural areas. Furthermore the bankers did
not present reliable data as to the cost of engaging in such business,47 and
the bankers were unable to agree among themselves on such matters as
regulation, supervision, civil penalties and rebate clauses.
The disagreement among bankers on the latter points arose, among other
things, from legal problems. National banks are entitled to the benefit of
any increase in the maximum rate of interest allowed to banks generally
but are not subject to state laws relating to penalties, regulation, supervision,
etc.48 Since a rebate clause is essential in any small loan law where interest
may be discounted or added to the face of the note, the possibility of discrim-
ination against state banks and in favor of national banks on the matter
of rebates as well as on the matter of the additional trouble and expense
of supervision and regulation is apparent. The fact that the legislature in
1941 and 1943 was unable to find and to agree on a solution to all these
46. Bailey committee recommended such a law, op. cit. supra n. 36, page 2223.
47. The Bailey committee report commented, op. cit. supra n. 36, page 2223,
on the lack of definite statistics and on the lack of agreement among bankers as
to the necessary rate of interest. In fairness to the bankers it must be noted:(1) Banks' cost accounting practices probably did not make such figures available
and, if not, it would have required considerable effort to have produced such figures.
(2) Different banks contemplated making various different types of loans. Hence
the differences of opinion as to the necessary rate of interest. From the standpoint
of the bankers these differences of opinions were logical. However the bankers
should not have been surprised when the confused and uncertain legislative front
which they presented produced uncertainty and confusion in the minds of the
legislators.
48. This is the holding of one of the very few Missouri cases involving a
small loan made by a bank. First National Bank of Steele v. Hopkins, 59 S.W.
2d 773 (Mo. App. 1933). The bank loaned Hopkins $400 on March 27, 1930
and he signed a note for. $432 due October 15, 1930. After foreclosing a chattel
mortgage given for security the bank sued for a deficiency. Hopkins counter,
claimed for damages for the wrongful foreclosure of the mortgage which he con-
tended was void under Sec. 408.070, Mo. REv. STAT. (1949), on account of the
usury-better than 15% per year. The court reversed a judgment for defendant
on the counterclaim holding that a national bank is authorized to charge the
highest amount of interest allowed by Missouri law, but is subject only to the
penalties of the National Banking Act (a separate action to recover twice the
amount of usurious interest actually paid). See the leading cases of Farmers and
Mechanics National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29 (1875) and Central National
Bank v. Haseltine, 73 Mo. App. 60 (1898), affd. 1,55 Mo. 58, 55 S.W. 1015 (1900)
affd. 183 U. S. 132 (1901). More recent cases are: Rushton v. Schram, 143 F. 2d
554 (6th Cir. 1944) and National City Bank of N. Y. v. Levine, 155 Misc. 132,
277 N. Y. Supp. 664 (Mun. Ct. 1933).
1951]
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problems should not necessarily be taken as evidence of unwillingness to
see the banks enter the small loans field.
VII. PAWNBROKER LAWS
Laws relating to pawnbrokers antedate those of any other lender in
the small loans field. Strangely enough less has been accomplished toward
effectively regulatory laws for pawnbrokers. In 1941 Rolf Nugent, then
of the Russell Sage Foundation, advised the author that he knew of no
state laws or in fact any model laws which he could wholeheartedly recom-
mend. The pawnbroker holds the pledged article and should be permitted
to charge for this service. Reports to and regulations by the police are nec-
essary to aid in recovery of stolen goods. Many loans are in small amounts
and of short duration. Redemption or sale of pledged articles involve a
myriad of problems. These are only a few of the reasons for the difficulty
in drafting satisfactory legislation.
An 1879 law of Missouri (Laws, p. 162) allowed pawnbrokers to charge
5% interest per month on loans under $20.00 and 3% per month on loans
of $20.00 and over. In 1889 the law which has remained virtually unchanged
to date was enacted.49 As to interest, this equivocal law" states that it shall
be unlawful for a pawnbroker to charge more than 2% per month. Pawn-
brokers act on the theory that the law authorizes 2% per month, a con-
struction which seems to strain the language.51 The provisions for redemp-
tion and sale52 are far from satisfactory and the author is unable to ex-
press an opinion as to the efficacy of those police regulations aimed at aiding
in the tracing of stolen property.
There was some interest in rewriting the pawnbroker laws in 1941,
interest which created confusion in the minds of most persons and led to no
tangible results. Because of the antiquity of the business, the author ven-
tures the suggestion that the pawnbroker business is regulated more by
custom than it is by law. In Kansas City, 10% per month seems to be a
fairly common charge. This apparent flouting of the law cannot be con-
doned. On the other hand a charge of $2.50 for a $25.00 loan for one month
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7208 (1889). See Mo. REv. STAT. c. 367 (1949).
50. Mo. REv. STAT. § 367.010 (1949).
51. This section does not seem to have been construed, a situation not too
surprising in view of the small size of most loans and the cost of litigation. There
are a few cases on rights of redemption and holding that a usurious charge voids
the pledge agreement giving rise to a right to replevin or action for a wrongful sale.
Such rights are based on Sec. 408.070, Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
52. Id. § 367.020.
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may not result in a large profit, if any, to a pawnbroker who has to open
books on the transaction, report to the police and assume liability for the safe
storage of the pledged article. The solution would seems to lie here, as it
does in other phases of the small loans problem, in segregating from interest
charges, the expense to the lender of those services which are actually per-
formed for the benefit of the borrower and which have no relation to the
forebearance of money.
VIII. THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION OF 1945
Section 44 of Article III of the Missouri Constitution of 1945 has no
counterpart in other state constitutions. It is as follows:
"No law shall be valid fixing rates of interest or return for the loan
or use of money, or the service or other charges made or imposed
in connection therewith, for any particular group or class engaged
in lending money. The rates of interest fixed by law shall be ap-
plicable generally and to all lenders without regard to the type or
classification of their business."
The previous Missouri constitution had contained no limitation on the
power of the legislature to regulate interest rates beyond a requirement that
there be no special law fixing interest rates.53 This latter provision is com-
mon to many state constitutions." A few state constitutions prescribe a
maximum interest rate 5 but this practice is now not generally regarded as
sound. Other states have apparently been able to solve their small loans
problem in a satisfactory manner without a constitutional provision such as
Section 44.51 Hence the reasons which led to its adoption and the policy it
enunciates is a matter of interest.
53. Mo. CONST. Art. IV, § 53 (20) (1875): "The General Assembly shall
not pass any local or special law fixing the rate of interest. This same prohibition
is also included in the Constitution of 1945, Article III, Sec. 40(26).
54. See Constitutions of the following states: Arizona, Art. IV, Sec. 19;
Alabama, Art. IV, Sec. 104; Illinois, Art. IV, Sec. 22; Indiana, Art. IV, Sec. 22;
Kentucky, Sec. 59, Louisiana, Art. IV, Sec. 4; New York, Art. III, Sec. 18; Penn-
sylvania, Art. III, Sec. 7; Utah, Article VI, Sec. 26; Washington, Art. II, Sec. 28;
West Virginia, Art. VI, Sec. 39; Wyoming, Art. III, Sec. 27.
55. There are at least five such states. See Constitutions of Arkansas, Art.
XIX; California, Art. XX, Sec. 22; Oklahoma, Art. XIV, Sec. 2; Tennessee, Art. II,
Sec. 7; and Texas, Art. XVI, Sec. 11.
56. Nebraska, for instance, has separate small loan laws relating to pawn-
brokers, credit unions, loan and investment companies, small loan licensees, and
banks. The chief difficulty with the Nebraska small loan law relating to banks
is that national banks claim immunity from the penalty provisions and from
regulation and supervision. Section 44 of our constitution has not solved this
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Previous laws in the small loans field had classified lenders according
to the type of loan which they made. These laws permitted to all within the
class charges commensurate with the expense of making loans of the type
involved. Historical accident, as we have seen, has played a considerable
part in determining the place of pawnbrokers, credit unions, loan and invest-
ment companies, small loan companies, banks and other credit institutions in
the consumer credit field. As the demand for small loans arose, credit insti-
tutions which were already present tried to make their methods of operation
conform in such manner as would satisfy that demand. Through the efforts
of lenders and of the public, legislation evolved which authorized these
methods of operation and which permitted the satisfaction of the demand
for small loans under the supervision of state officials.
The Credit Union Act and the Loan and Investment Company Act,
therefore, applied only to certain kinds of corporations. The Pawnbroker
laws applied only to a certain class of lenders. Those laws are now unconsti-
tutional under Section 44, at least insofar as they authorize interest or other
charges in excess of 8% per annum. It is at least arguable that the portion
of Section 362.105, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), which authorizes
banks to "receive or retain in advance" the highest rate allowed by law
may be unconstitutional for the same reasons. The small loan laws were
available to any person, partnership or corporation which applied for a
license but by their terms they excluded banks, loan and investment com-
panies, credit unions and pawnbrokers. It was this exclusion clause which
rendered all the small loan laws unconstitutional under Section 44 in 1947,
in the case of Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner.7
With the exception of banks, the other lenders excluded from the opera-
tion of the small loan laws were apparently satisfied with their own opera-
tions and the laws under which they were operating. At least there is
no record of any desire on their part to be included within the terms of the
small loan laws or of their advocacy of Section 44. Accordingly it seems to
follow that the pressure for adoption of Section 44 originated with banks
and with those who desired to see the banks authorized to operate under
small loan laws.58
57. 356 Mo. 808, 203 S.W. 2d 734 (1947).
58. See the resolution adopted by the Council of Administration of the Mis-
souri Bankers Association May 17, 1944 (shortly after Section 44 was introduced
in the Convention) urging the Constitutional Convention to approve Section 44.
The author of Section 44 stated on the floor of the Convention that he was a director
of three banks and held stock in others. Transcript of the Convention, p. 899. He
had also been active in urging small loans legislation for banks in prior sessions
of the legislature.
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Some members of the Convention had the impression that the small
loan laws were monopolistic in character or at least that there was a lack of
competition in the field. While small loan licensees had no monopoly on
their commodity (money) or on the services rendered (the loaning of
money), it is true that only a licensee under the Small Loan Laws could
charge the rates permitted by those laws. Although the shareholders of a
loan and investment company, a bank, etc., as individuals, partners or as
shareholders in another corporation could obtain a small loan license and
operate under the small loan laws, the Convention did not believe this
would have the same effect as permitting banks, loan and investment com-
panies, etc., as such to operate under small loans laws. In any event the
Convention (from the tenor of the debates) was interested in lowering in-
terest rates. Without discussion of the difficulties of including banks in
small loans legislation, the Convention apparently assumed that the legis-
lature would not ihclude banks in small loans legislation unless forced to
do so, and that including banks would necessarily result in a lowering of
interest rates. Scant attention was given in the Convention to the possibility
that forcing the legislature to include banks might result in raising the
charges which previously had been allowed banks on small loans.5 9
The failure to consider the history and the legal and economic back-
ground of the small loans problem in Missouri, was inevitable from the
manner in which Section 44 originated. The committee of the Convention
which made recommendations on that portion of the constitution relating
to interest originally proposed that interest rates be limited to a maximum
of 18% per year. Section 44 was proposed from the floor of the Convention
as a substitute and was debated by the entire Convention without the bene-
fit of committee hearings. Whether deliberately or by accident an atmos-
phere was created in the Convention wherein anyone who opposed Section
44, regardless of his reasons, thereby labelled himself as one who favored
high interest rates. The atmosphere therefore was not conducive to sober
consideration of the intricacies of the problem. Furthermore some members
of the convention believed that other provisions of the constitution were
of far greater importance to the state as a whole. While these persons en-
tertained misgivings as to the advisability of including Section 44 they were
constrained to vote for it in order to marshall support for other portions of
59. The author has read and reread the transcript of the debates in the
Convention on Section 44 as well as newspapers of the time. Limitations of space
however prevent documentation of much of this comment on the Convention.
1951]
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the constitution. It is therefore of interest that the vote on Section 44 in
the Convention was close.
While this discussion of the background of Section 44 is pertinent be-
cause of the grave doubt in the minds of many attorneys that any feasible
solution of the small loans problem is possible under that section, we can
turn now to a consideration of what the policy of the section is. Succinctly
stated, that policy is that all lenders must be treated alike in the matter of
charges for or in connection with the loan of money. The contention also
possible under Section 44 that all borrowers must likewise be treated alike
would seem to be negated by the language of our supreme court in the case
of Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffer, supra, to the effect that loans
may be classified. It is manifestly impractical to attempt to license, regu-
late and supervise every individual who may occasionally make a loan of
money. It is also doubtful whether it is possible under Section 44 to classify
for the purposes of licensing, supervision and regulation only those lenders
who regularly engage in the business of loaning money. Hence there is a
distinct possibility that the small loan business in Missouri in the future may
be one without these provisions which have generally been regarded as de-
sirable in any small loans legislation. This possibility has been recognized
by the legislature in that all attempts to write a small loan law since 1946
have been in the form of two bills, one fixing the interest rate and penalties
for violation of it and the other bill establishing licensing, regulation and
supervision for those persons who regularly engage in the business of lend-
ing money.
The old distinctions between small loan companies, loan and invest-
ment companies, banks, etc., will very likely be obliterated in the future in
Missouri. Since the constitution requires all lenders to be treated alike,
all lenders will have equal powers and every lending institution will be
legally clothed ,with the power to make any kind of loan regardless of size,
character, security or any other such factor. Should lending institutions
find it sound to operate in this manner, they should be able to spread over-
head over a wider field of activity. In turn this should result in increased
competition and lower costs to the borrower. It will thus be seen that the
state of Missouri is about to embark on an experiment in the small loans
field which will be watched with great interest throughout the nation. 0
60. For an authoritative discussion of the overall implications of Section 44,
see Hubachek. The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code, 16 U. OF Ci. L. RE.v.
609, 627 (1949), where the author says:
"The new Missouri constitution is a dramatic illustration of an effort to
force codification. Missouri is now under a constitutional necessity to
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
No attempt to analyze the proposals which have been made in the last
two sessions of the legislature is made here as they will be discussed else-
where in this issue.61 A consideration of those bills, of the debates in the
legislature on those bills and of all the past history of the small loan prob-
lem in Missouri does, however, lead to definite conclusions. Certain char-
acteristics of small loan legislation are so generally recognized to be essen-
tial that they are no longer an issue in Missouri. They are as follows:
1. Licensing, supervision and regulation by state officials. The de-
sirability of these requirements was not even discussed in the Constitutional
Convention and the merits of bills incorporating such provisions have not
seriously been questioned in the legislature for more than twenty years. In
fact, the trend has been to tighten supervision and regulation. The bringing
of loan and investment companies under regulation and supervision in Mis-
souri in the last decade and the noteworthy results in eliminating abuses
which existed under the law is a case in point. Since the effective date of
the Constitution, proposed small loan legislation has included licensing,
supervision and regulation.
While a few individuals contend that making it a felony to exact usury
will, in itself, solve the small loan problem, this view is so unrealistic as
to call for little discussion. Prosecuting attorneys and lawyers in private
practice who have actually been confronted with instituting criminal prose-
cutions against loan sharks do not endorse this theory. The evasive tactics
of loan sharks are too numerous and too devious. As shown elsewhere in this
issue criminal prosecutions are no permanent solution to the problem.
62
2. Severe civil and criminal penalties coupled with adequate definitions
of evasive tactics so as to bring the person who violates the law within the
purview of the law. Here again and for many years these requirements have
not been questioned by the legislature or by persons informed on the small
codify its interest laws and treat all classes of lenders substantially the
same for the purpose of statutes fixing maximum interest rates. The
effect of the new constitution was to destroy all existing legislation author-
izing rates of interest in excess of the general maximum, 8 per cent a year,
fixed by the usury law. Missouri has been without a small loan law or
any other regulatory interest law based on lender classification since
July 1, 1946, when the new constitution became effective. The Missouri
legislature has been unable to solve this problem despite a steady suc-
cession of bills in regular and special legislative sessions beginning in 1945."
61. See McReynolds infra p. 292.
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loans problem. Prior to the Constitution, the definition of evasive tactics,
and the penalties provided, were so effective that there was seldom occasion
to resort to the courts, but when the necessity did arise the laws then in
effect were found to be adequate. 3 The chief deterrent to illegal practices
from the civil point of view is revocation of the license. The lender is not
likely to risk his entire business for the sake of usurious charges on a few
loans. Among lenders who are operating in violation of the law and/or
without a license, the most effective provision is that of the Small Loan
Laws [Section 8168, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939)] which renders void
any usurious loan and denies to the lender the recovery of either principal
or interest. Section 408.070, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), voids any
security given for such a loan.
3. Adequate charges for loans. The charges must be something in
excess of the ordinary contract rate of interest of 8%o. Even in the Consti-
tutional Convention where the thinking on charges for loans seemed to
depend more upon emotion than upon economic factors, it was recognized
that something more than 8% per annum would have to be allowed lenders
in the small loan field to interest them in engaging in the business. In cur-
rent legislative discussions, few proposals have suggested an annual charge,
inclusive of fees for services, below 18% or above 36% per year, depending
on the size of loans, the security, etc.
Hence we can conclude that the two important problems remaining to
be solved in Missouri are:
1. A determination of what a fair charge is for small loans which will
be high enough but no higher than that necessary to induce legitimate
capital to engage in the business.
2. A solution of the peculiar problems created by the unusual pro-
visions of Section 44 of Article III of the Constitution of 1945.
Of these problems the first in importance is that of charges. Nothing
is to be gained by considering the constitutional questions unless we can
reasonably anticipate that some lenders will be operating under the law.
Experience with the Missouri 1913 Act and in Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama,
and the District of Columbia establishes this beyond question. As Dr. Upton
points out, the maximum amount of charges to be allowed relates directly
to the type of loans which the legislature desires to encourage. After the
legislature has decided the questions of policy, the rate structure is largely
a matter of the analysis and compilation of economic data. We leave these
63. See footnote 22, supra.
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questions to the economist. However, when the amount of charges has been
determined, the lawyer may interest himself in the manner of stating the
maximum amount of charge allowed by law.
The small loan laws are virtually alone, in the field of lending, in re-
quiring that all charges in connection with the loan, whether for services
rendered or for forbearance of money, be denominated as interest. Other
lending institutions charge the ordinary contract rate of interest, and charge
separately for services in connection with the loan. In a real estate loan
the borrower pays the costs of appraisal of the property, of the survey, of a
legal opinion on the title, of recording fees, etc. A bank may require an
expensive audit and cumbersome and expensive controls of inventory~or of
accounts receivable in connection with the loan. All such expenses are borne
by the borrower and are part of the cost of the loan, but neither the borrower
nor the courts consider them to be interest on the money borrowed. Simi-
larly, the small loan licensee may expend money for a credit investigation
and pay its employees to visit the borrower's home for the purpose of ap-
praising and listing on a chattel mortgage the borrower's household goods.
These expenses must be born by the licensee and recouped from his interest
charges.
Under these circumstances it is obvious that what is denominated to be
the maximum interest rate allowed a small loan licensee must be larger than
that allowed other lenders who are not required to classify as interest their
charges for services rendered. This, we submit, constituted much of the
basis for the misunderstanding in the Constitutional Convention and in
many recent sessions of the legislature. It confuses the borrower and the
public. Is it necessary to take on the emotional and intellectual hazards of
attempting to justify an interest charge of 3% per month or 36% per year,
for instance, when such charge is composed principally of items which are
not interest at all? Is it not time to revise our nomenclature, allow the small
loan licensee 8% per year as interest and permit, in addition, such charges
for investigation of credit, appraisal of property, drawing of instruments,
cost of collection, etc., as will reasonably reimburse the lender for his ex-
penses? Such a proposal would force a realistic appraisal of the fundamental
economic factors involved in the matter of fair charges for small loans.
The suggestion has the further merit of being a more satisfactory solu-
tion to the peculiar problems created by Section 44 of the new Constitution.
Any law fixing interest rates or service charges must now apply to all
lenders alike. Most lenders traditionally have segregated their service
1951]
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charges from their interest charges. That method has worked successfully
in practice for many years as to larger loans without regulation or super-
vision of any kind. If, as suggested by the Shaffner case, it is possible to
classify loans under the new Constitution, then the need for regulating serv-
ice charges in the case of small loans is at once apparent. The disparity in
bargaining power between the borrower and the lender, the greater familiar-
ity of the latter with lending transactions and the opportunities for abuse,
guarantee the constitutional propriety of regulation of such service charges.
The reasons which led the Russell Sage Foundation to recommend the
all inclusive "interest" rate in 1916 were sound in the light of conditions as
they then existed. In the intervening 35 years, however, the consumer credit
business has matured and along with it the borrowing public has grown in
intellectual stature. The difficulties in supervising an interest plus serv-
ice charges statute which were then encountered have proved remarkably
absent in states such as Oklahoma, Colorado and Arkansas which have such
small loan laws. Furthermore each succeeding legislature does not need to
be briefed on the intricacies of an all inclusive interest rate. There is no
argument about the ordinary contract rate of interest and the service
charges can be discussed without emotion.
The peculiar problems created by Section 44 are practical as well as
legal. The legal problems, which involve the question as to whether or not
licensing, supervision and regulation and classification of loans are possible,
will be considered in Senator McReynolds' article. The practical problems
include the matter of evolving a rate structure and forms of licensing, super-
vision and regulation which will be fair to the public and feasible for all
types of lenders. What the legislature knows but what the Constitutional
Convention failed to consider is that various kinds of lenders came into
being as a result of the demand for the peculiar services which they have
trained their personnel to furnish. Every loan office under Section 44 is
legally capable of making any kind of loan regardless of size, risk or security.
The lender, however, may question whether his personnel, trained in handl-
ing applicants for loans of $300.00 and under, can evaluate applicants for
loans of $1,000.00 or $5,000.00 or more. Moreover it is doubtful that the
busy executive desiring a $5,000.00 loan will line up with the man in overalls
who is applying for a $100.00 loan. It is no accident that banks have begun
to segregate their consumer loan departments from their banking offices and
that especially trained personnel have been placed in charge. The practical
benefits if any, of Section 44 therefore remain to be seen.
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X. THE SMALL LOAN LAWS OF 1951
On May 8, 1951 and after this article was virtually complete, Governor
Smith signed Senate Bills 78 and 79 which will be effective ninety days after
the adjournment or recess of this session of the legislature. The bills were
written with an eye to the possible constitutional difficulties in the path of
licensing, regulation and supervision. Hence we find the interest code pro-
visions in Senate Bill No. 79 and licensing, supervisory and regulatory pro-
visions in Senate Bill No. 78. In general it may be said that these bills to-
gether contain the elements of what experience has shown to be the require-
ments of sound, feasible small loans legislation. The bills recognize the
higher cost of engaging in the small loan business and surround the doing of
business with licensing, regulation, supervision and civil and criminal penal-
ties which have in the past been regarded as adequate. There are several
aspects of these bills however which seem to call for particular comment:
1. Senate Bill 79 provides, as to loans of $400.00 and less and in lieu
of all other charges, an interest rate of 2.218% per month or 26.596% per
year, or stated dollar wise, $15.00 per each $100.00 of principal to be repaid
in equal monthly installments in one year. Upon its face this appears to be
a reduction under the maximum rate allowed by the previous small loan
laws of 3o per month on loans of $100.00 and less and 2 'o per month on
loans of $100.00 to $300.00. Section 8 of Senate Bill 78, however, provides
that insurance premiums shall not be considered as interest, service charges
or fees in connection with any loan, and permits the Commissioner of Fi-
nance of Missouri to issue regulations providing and governing the types
and limits of insurance and the issuance of policies which may be sold in
connection with consumer credit loans. Whether there will be, in fact, any
reduction in charges to the borrower therefore will depend upon the fairness,
thoroughness and carefulness with which insurance regulations are framed
and enforced.
2. Section 408.032 of Senate Bill 79 provides for certain penalties
in the event of violation of the law and contains a detailed provision (sub-
paragraph f) for rebate of interest if the loan is prepaid in full by cash,
renewal or financing one month or more before the final installment date.
We have seen previously that neither the penalty nor the rebate provisions
of this section will apply to national banks.64 Since interest may be added to
64. See footnote 48, supra.
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the principal of the loan, the matter of rebate has an important bearing on
the return to the lender, particularly in the case of a prepayment by renewal.
Accordingly if national banks are especially favored by this Act by not being
subject to the rebate clause, then this factor may render tHe bill unconstitu-
tional under Section 44. On the other hand, general usury statutes do not
normally carry with them any right to a rebate. The fact that a lender is
not required to rebate is not ordinarily understood to affect the interest rate
for the reason that a rebate clause is inoperative if the contract is complied
with according to its terms. In the field of small loans, however, pre-payment
especially by renewal which may involve the lending of additional money is
relatively common and a rebate clause is essential in order to avoid the
offering of a loophole for avoidance of rate limitation.
3. By the terms of Senate Bill 78 both national and state banks are
relieved of the requirements of licensing, supervision and regulation. Be-
cause these institutions are supervised under other laws this exemption
would not invalidate Senate Bill 78 as a special law. However, one of the
serious problems faced by a legislature writing small loans legislation in-
volving banks has been the absence of the type of complete and authentic
information as to the cost of small loans which is required to be furnished by
Section 6 of Senate Bill 78 from which the banks are exempt. It is to be
hoped that the banks will voluntarily maintain such records and submit
such information to the Finance Commissioner so that this knowledge may
be available to subsequent sessions of the legislature.
4. The preliminary report of the Bailey committee commented on the
fact that the State Finance Commissioner has been inadequately supplied
with money and personnel wherewith to conduct annual audits of the op-
erations of licensed lenders. The annual reports required by Section 6 of
Senate Bill 78 are required to be under oath as were the reports of licensees
under the old small loan laws. While it is true that this requirement is, or
should be, a guarantee of the accuracy of these reports, nevertheless, it is
the opinion of the writer, as apparently it was of the Bailey committee, that
much of the argument concerning the cost of engaging in the small loan
business would be eliminated if the figures upon which these statements of
cost are based were audited by state officials. Section 7 of Senate Bill 78
gives the commissioner adequate power to make these audits and it is there-
fore the responsibility of the legislature to supply the commissioner with the
funds with which to do so.
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5. From the standpoint of stimulating competition it is probably a step
forward to have the maximum rate of interest stated dollar wise as well as
percentage wise. The author, however, still adheres to the views previously
expressed in the conclusion of this article, that it would have been more real-
istic had the legislature left the interest rate alone and established a system
of fees and charges which would reasonably compensate the lender for those
services rendered by him in additidn to the actual forebearance of money.
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